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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

NORTH DAKOTA

,

Graber v. Logan County Water Resource Bd., 598 N.W.2d 846 (N.D.
1999) (upholding Water Resources Board's findings that landowner
constructed a drain without required permit and was not exempted
from permit requirement, and that owner of adjacent land damaged
by drainage had standing to file a complaint).
David Graber ("Graber") owned farmland in Logan County, North
Dakota. A small wedand containing an outlet, and a channeled,
multi-culvert artificial drainage ditch lay northwest of this farmstead.
Graber claimed the ditch had been present in that location for many
years. Graber cleaned out the ditch in 1967 and 1994, and placed
culverts to create permanent access across the ditch in 1974 or 1975.
Water from the ditch flowed east and northeast across Graber's
property to farmland owned by his neighbor, Vernon Burkle
("Burkle").
In July 1995, Burkle filed a complaint with the Logan County
Water Resource Board ("Board"), alleging that water from Graber's
drain flooded his land and fences, and that livestock waste from
Graber's feedlot operations flushed down the drain onto his property,
polluting downstream waters, killing fish stocked in his slough, and
sickening his own livestock. The Board conducted an on-site
inspection of the ditch and its drainage, and ordered Graber to restore
the slough to its original level and fill the ditch.
Graber appealed the Board's order to the district court. Upon
remand, the Board dismissed Burkle's claim, stating that the complaint
failed to prove that construction of the drain did not occur prior to
1957, when the state law requiring a permit to construct a drain
became effective. The Board further held that work done on the drain
after 1957 was merely maintenance in nature and did not increase the
volume of water being discharge. Burkle appealed the Board's order.
Following a second hearing during which the parties presented
additional evidence, the Board ruled that construction of the drain
without a permit occurred after 1957, and the drain adversely affected
Burkle's property. The Board ordered Graber to close the drain.
Graber appealed, challenging the Board's closure order. The district
court found that the Board's decision was not arbitrary and capricious,
and affirmed. Graber appealed this decision.
This court held that the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously,
or unreasonably in ordering Graber to close the drain. The court
addressed four issues on appeal: (1) whether Graber dug the drainage
ditch on his property, and therefore, needed a permit under the state
law which became effective in 1957; (2) whether state law exempted
Graber from the permit requirement because he dug the ditch under
state or federal supervision; (3) whether Burkle had standing to file a
complaint with the Board because he experienced adverse effects from
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an unauthorized drain; and (4) whether Graber had obtained a
prescriptive drainage easement over Burkle's land.
The court noted that the appeal of a local governing body's
decision under state law limits its scope of review. The court stated
that its function is to independently determine the propriety of the
Board's decision, without according any special deference to the
district court's decision, and that the Board's decision must be
affirmed unless the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably, or no substantial evidence supports the decision.
In addressing the first issue on appeal, the court noted that Graber
did not obtain a permit or flowage easements from downstream
landowners prior to working on the ditch in 1967 and 1994. However,
Graber claimed that state law did not require him to obtain a permit
because construction of the ditch occurred before the state statute
requiring drainage permits was enacted in July 1, 1957. Moreover, he
performed merely maintenance work on the ditch in 1967 and 1994.
The court stated that, "[t]he law in effect at the time a drain is
constructed controls." The court pointed out that testimony given by
several witnesses, including individuals who had previously leased the
farm or had been present on the property, established that no
drainage ditch existed on the property prior to July 1, 1957. The court
held that the Board therefore, had not acted arbitrarily, capriciously or
unreasonably in finding that construction of the ditch occurred after
July 1, 1957, and thus, state law required a permit.
The court next addressed Graber's claim that state law exempted
him from the permit requirement because he had constructed a drain
"under the supervision of a state or federal agency." Graber and
his
father testified that in 1967, an agent from the local Soil Conservation
Service ("SCS") office surveyed the property to determine the bottom
of the lake and ditch, and in 1994, SCS had granted Graber permission
to clean out the ditch.
The court, however, reiterated that
"supervision" requires greater involvement in a drainage project
than
rendering mere technical assistance. The court concluded that the
Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably in finding
that no supervision by a federal or state agency occurred to exempt
Graber from the permit requirement.
The third and fourth issues raised on appeal involved Graber's
challenge to Burkle's standing to file a complaint concerning the
impact of drainage on his property. The court pointed out that under
North Dakota law, only a landowner experiencing flooding or adverse
effects of an unauthorized drain constructed prior to January 1, 1975,
can file a complaint to the Board. Graber claimed that any adverse
effects experienced by Burkle were not the result of the drain, but of a
dam located downstream which blocked water back onto Burkle's
property. The court, however, noted that Board members conducted
an on-site inspection and observed water flowing from Graber's drain
onto Burkle's property. Burkle also testified that water began flowing
onto his property when Graber re-dug the drain in 1994, and that this
water flooded fifteen to twenty acres of his property, destroying fences,
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and killing grass. Based on this evidence, the court concluded that the
Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably in finding
that the drainage damaged Burkle's property, thereby giving him
standing.
The court also addressed Graber's claim that Burkle lacked
standing to file a complaint with the Board because Graber acquired a
prescriptive drainage easement over Burkle's property. The court
stated that a prescriptive easement on flooded land required
continuous and uninterrupted adverse use for the twenty-year
prescriptive period under state law. According to the court, the
Board's findings revealed that Graber failed to establish that drainage
over Burkle's property was continuous and uninterrupted for the
twenty years. Testimony from several individuals established that no
drainage occurred shortly after 1967 when Graber's father filled in the
ditch, and that no drainage onto Burkle's property occurred at all
from the 1970s until 1994, when Graber reopened the ditch.
Accordingly, the court held, Graber did not acquire a prescriptive
drainage easement over Burkle's property.
Steven Marlin

State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 592 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1999)
(holding that the ordinary high watermark of a river is determined
according to its current condition).
The State of North Dakota and Mills had competing interests in
sixty-two acres of shore zone along the Missouri River. Shore zone is
the area between the ordinary low watermark and the ordinary high
watermark of a river. North Dakota law gives the state property rights
up to the ordinary high watermark, and Mills owned the land above
that boundary. Mills asserted that he held exclusive rights to the
disputed shore zone because it was above the ordinary high watermark
of the river prior to the operation of the Missouri River dam system.
The State instituted a declaratory judgment action to determine
the parties' interests in the disputed land. In an earlier proceeding,
the Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded that the State and
Mills shared correlative, overlapping rights in the shore zone. Upon
remand, the trial court determined the Missouri River's ordinary high
watermark based on the river's current, post-dam condition. Mills
appealed this judgment contending that the trial court erred in not
assessing the River's ordinary high watermark according to its natural,
pre-dam state.
The specific issue on appeal was whether the ordinary high
watermark of a river should be determined by its current, artificial
condition or by its natural, pre-dam position. The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's ruling by holding that the current water line
is the boundary line regardless of whether it has been affected by
natural or artificial changes. Thus, the court held that the ordinary

